ABSTRACT The protection of cyber-physical networks is a topic of increasing importance. The evolution of IT (cyber) systems that control and supervise the underlying physical system has grown over decades, whereas security has not become a concern until quite recently. Advanced persistent threats (APTs) have proven to be a difficult but significant challenge for practitioners. This paper adopts a game-theoretic modeling of APTs and applies it to the (sub) problem of physical intrusion in an infrastructure. The gap between defining a good theoretical model and practically instantiating it is considered in particular. The model description serves to illustrate what is needed to put it into practice. The main contribution of this paper is the demonstration of how simulation, physical understanding of an infrastructure, and theoretical methods can be combined toward a practical solution to the physical intrusion avoidance problem. Numerical results are given to show how the physical intrusion game is being set up, and how the results obtained from its analysis can be interpreted and used for an optimized defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructures are becoming increasingly complex and heterogeneous in the sense of combining multiple physical and logical components into highly complex systems. The integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) such as sensor networks, cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) can significantly improve the efficiency of the planning and operation of the critical infrastructures. For example, the phasor measurement unit (PMU) devices for electric power grids can provide state awareness to the system operator, detect early faults, and prevent unanticipated power outages [1] - [3] . The employment of mobile surveillance cameras for airports and train stations can help to detect abnormal behaviors and identify potential terrorist threats [4] .
While ICTs enhance the operations of critical infrastructures (CIs), the reliance on ICTs will at the same time make the CIs vulnerable to coordinated cyber-physical attacks. Modern CIs are cyber-physical systems, inheriting existing vulnerabilities from both cyber and physical sides.
Vulnerabilities include the jamming of communication, eavesdropping and physical tampering. The cyber-physical interdependencies enlarge the attack surface and create new cyber-physical attacks that can be stealthy, extremely damaging and difficult to defend against [5] , [6] . An intelligent attacker can take a sequence of actions involving compromising both cyber and physical assets to achieve their objective. For example, a terrorist can first launch a cyber attack to disable the surveillance camera, stealthily enter a building without being detected, and place a bomb. This type of adversary is featured by the coordination of multiple attacks on cyber and physical assets, in which the success of one attack plays an important role in mounting the next attack. The compromise of a cyber asset will make the physical target more vulnerable. Similarly, the compromise of a physical asset can expose the cyber asset without protection.
One important feature of coordinated cyber-physical attacks is that they are implemented in multiple stages. The defense has to take a holistic viewpoint to plan defense strategies over multiple layers and stages of the system instead of a myopic and local protection of the assets. To this end, we aim to develop a dynamic game-theoretic framework to capture the multi-stage interactions between the coordinated attack and the system operator. In particular, we adopt a nested game structure in which one game is nested in another game to capture the fact that the outcome of one game affects the structure of the game in the following stage. The proposed framework has a games-in-games feature that allows modeling the dynamics of the attack movement in CIs.
The equilibrium analysis of the dynamic game relies on the application of dynamic programming techniques and solving a sequence of games. This supports a risk assessment of the infrastructure under such attacks and provides fundamental principles to design defense-in-depth mechanisms that yield security strategies to defend CIs. To illustrate the gametheoretic method, we use property protection (physical access control) as our primary example. The building can be a utility provider, data center or an airport equipped with both cyber and physical assets. The goal of the attacker is to intrude the building and steal or compromise a targeted physical asset. The interaction between the attacker and the system is captured using a three-phase game that models the three interdependent and essential stages of coordinated attacks. Using the developed modeling and analysis techniques, we will show:
• how different games can be tailored together to create a model accounting for the characteristic phases and targets of coordinated attacks,
• how the model parameters can be obtained in a practical setting, based on real-life surveillance architectures,
• how the analysis of the game (equilibria and respective policies) should be interpreted and used towards an optimized protection.
A. RELATED WORK
Recent literature has witnessed a surge of interest in cyberphysical attacks for critical infrastructures. The smart grid has been a prime example of cyber-physical systems subject to attacks like data injection [7] , [8] , coordinated attacks [9] , and switching attacks [10] . Enhancing cyber-physical system security requires an investigation of the cyber and physical layers of the system as a whole. This principle is essentially important for understanding coordinated attacks in which the cyber and physical assets cannot be separable for modeling and analysis [5] , [6] . Game theory is a pivotal model tool to model the incentives and the objectives of the attacker and his interactions with the system [11] , enabling the risk assessment under adversarial environment and the design of automated defense mechanisms. The application of game theory has been used to address airport security, security of autonomous systems, cloud security, and smart grid security. To capture the sophistication of the attack models in cyber-physical systems, recent advances in game theory include the development of multi-stage dynamic games [12] - [14] , games-in-games framework [15] - [17] , and stochastic games [18] - [20] .
In terms of applications, our work clearly relates to research in the area of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), whose diversity, in particular, includes attacks on physical security. Especially when it comes to physical boundaries or physically separated parts of a network, social engineering and physical espionage become relevant, which this work explicitly treats. Among the earliest work applying game theory to APTs is [21] - [24] , with a full game-theoretic model covering all main phases of an APT having been devised in [12] . This is the model that we are going to instantiate hereafter.
II. PHYSICAL AND CYBER SECURITY
A working defense against contemporary cyber-attacks that are highly adapted to their specific victim systems, requires security models that are equally flexible and can account for the specifics of the system to be protected. In the apparent absence (perhaps even non-existence) of a ''generalpurpose'' security notion that covers all relevant attack vectors, we will develop our specific model based on an a priori investigation of typical physical and cyber security controls. Powerful attacks exploit combinations of attacks on different vulnerabilities to ultimately penetrate a system. Therefore, the security model that we describe will have different parts tailored to the specific attack life-cycle. To this end, we will first require an understanding of typical security controls, so that we can identify a set of ways to bypass them.
A. TRADITIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
With the emergence of cyber-physical systems in recent years and the increased interaction between physical infrastructures and people, on the one hand, as well as technology and computational components, on the other hand, a special focus has been laid on cyber crimes and how to improve cyber security in the contemporary complex workplace. In contrast, physical security has been relatively overlooked or improperly enforced in some places. Cyber security aims at protecting assets and resources in cyberspace by blocking unauthorized remote access to networks and assets. Still, the attackers have the opportunity to gain access by physically entering an organization's premises and connecting to the network, servers, or any other device available on site.
Traditionally, physical security of enterprises has been mainly shaped by the castle (fortress) protection model, which aims at building a hard shell around a presumably trusted area encompassing different valuable assets varying from people, hardware and software to data and information resources. Therefore, various security controls have been deployed and mounted at the outer boundaries of the facility of interest establishing the so-called security perimeter. In general, the perimetric controls are designed and implemented with the D5 strategy in mind; i.e. Demarcation, Deter, Detect, Delay and Defend [25] . Demarcation refers to the process of creating boundaries around important assets. These boundaries should be visible to avoid innocent boundary crossings and to simplify identifying hostile intentions.
The goal of deterrence is to create an unattractive environment for potential adversaries. Security lighting, fences, monitoring points, and surveillance systems are, for example, effective deterrents since they are able to reduce an attacker's opportunity to commit his attack unobserved. However, deterrent efforts are not enough to keep adversaries out. Therefore, it is of vital importance for the perimeter to be able to detect unwanted activities and to delay potential perpetrators long enough to allow security forces or first responders to intercept and defend by denying access to the internal critical assets and resources. An enterprise's security perimeter can include common protecting components and mechanical barriers such as fences, walls, monitoring points, entrance gates or doors, vehicle barriers, security lighting, landscaping, video surveillance systems, alarm systems, guards, intrusion detection systems, among others. For example, closedcircuit television cameras are increasingly used to provide features such as standard monitoring, recording, event detection and forensic analysis. They transmit video signals over dedicated coaxial cables or any common computer network to a specific video control system and to a limited number of monitors in a central monitoring station that is mostly serviced by a third party contractor. In addition to this, the physical access is sometimes limited to authorized users with valid credentials such as identity badges. Due to the fixed installation of these security solutions they tend to remain static and inflexible in their operation.
Although all of these controls have been used to ensure that any contact with the protected assets is authorised, a breach of the physical security remains probable due to accidents, human errors or even targeted attacks. Attackers leverage the static nature of these mechanisms and the predictable placement of their devices to sneak into the facility. Moreover, the ongoing trend demanding enterprises to become more flexible and dynamic, as well as the increasing rate of collaboration and interconnection, make the solid security perimeter of these systems very porous. As a result, the perimeter is no more able to keep risk resources in the outside environment. The current tendency of an organization to extend beyond their conventional borders to reach other entities such as vendors, business partners, service providers or even customer results in having different external entities within the systems' complex such as temporary workers, interns, independent contractors and subcontractors, or even visitors. Even if the access to the industrial sensitive zones is tightly controlled at the borders, behind the borders the freedom of movement is almost entirely ensured for ordinary organization's personnel as well as for temporary ones. Therefore, potential adversaries can exploit the dynamic nature of the systems and lack of a proper resource management strategy to cause loss and damage. As a result, the assumption that the inside does not have attack sources and it is outfitted with less protection is no more valid.
Undetectability within the system complex will give the adversary a good opportunity to reconnaissance the target area, to gather some sensitive information, and to probably cover the tracks of ongoing attacks, too. Nowadays attackers will exploit different attack vectors trying repeatedly to adapt to the defender strategies [26] . Therefore, it is highly important to maintain situational awareness even within the system complex so that the potential intruders can remain detectable and the security managers are able to respond timely. Having dynamic and mobile surveillance systems (or strategies) will definitely increase the system robustness and increase the attack costs and complexity. This, in turn, will give the system's defenders the advantage to stay ahead of the attackers in the respective security game.
B. CYBER-AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING THREATS
Cyber security is a broad term that comprises technical, organizational but also staff-related aspects, and as such cannot be covered by purely technical security notions. However, and conversely, organizational assumptions and those on the staff indeed are crucially underlying any technical precaution. The most important examples are security notions in cryptography, which effectively equal security to the secrecy of the underlying keys. Once a key is known, any security proof or other formal argument of security becomes void. This extends to many (if not all) other technical security precautions as well, since access credentials are to be protected, but at some point, the protection must ultimately rely on human behavior and awareness. This is essentially the point where attacks are mounted for the mere reason of efficiency: stealing an access credential or spying out a cryptographic key is in most cases much cheaper than running an expensive (and time-consuming) cryptanalysis. The achievements of cryptography and related areas (see [27] ) have made the attacker concentrate its efforts on the weakest element, which is the human; and this weakness is very well documented [28] . Although solutions to some vulnerabilities have been proposed [29] , there remains much to be done. Essentially, social engineering is a matter of exploiting human's unawareness of a threat. Consequently, awareness trainings, spot checks, etc. appear to be only a few natural countermeasures, but none of which has a permanent effect. An effective protection against social engineering thus calls for a continuous information and training campaign, which costs money and time, and the question of an optimal investment in these measures directly relates security to economics. The tradeoff between security investment and the positive effects of it (the return-of-investment), however, also exists in the opposite direction on the attacker's side, which directly induces a non-formal yet practically effective understanding of security that we describe next.
C. SECURITY (IS) ECONOMICS
Security is usually not about making an attack impossible, since it is fully sufficient to render an attack non-economic. That is, if the investment of the attacker exceeds the revenue received upon success, it is simply not meaningful to mount the attack. Consequently, our attack/defense model will consider costs incurred throughout the lifetime of the intrusion attempt, by measuring the ''optimal'' cost/benefit tradeoff in the defense. The resulting model, in light of this balance and conflict, is thus a two-player game between the defender seeking to maximize the attacker's costs, opposing an attacker attempting to minimize its investment in order to maximize the final revenue (quantified by the damage caused, minus the investment that has been necessary). The numeric analysis described in Section IV-E will culminate exactly in this final conclusion about the economic efficiency of an attack.
III. GAME-THEORETIC MODELING OF PHYSICAL INTRUSION
Recent work on game-theoretic modeling of APTs [12] suggests decomposing a general attack into the following three phases, which in related work is occasionally referred to as the ''kill-chain''. The main observation here is that a physical intrusion can work along the same lines:
1) Initial penetration (phase one): this phase is completed if the attacker has established in initial contact with the victim infrastructure; more precisely, a contact point within the system has been set up (typically, a piece of malware has been installed via a successful phishing email, or similar). For a pure physical access attempt, a logical entry point can be used to gather information about legitimate employees, so as, for example, to create a validly looking fake identity. 2) Learning and Propagation (phase two): this phase comprises a possibly long period in which the attacker remains stealthy and gathers information about the victim's infrastructure. The goal is to penetrate the facilities as deep as possible, in order to get near neuralgic points where damage can be caused subsequently. 3) Damaging (phase three): this is the time when the attacker becomes visibly active and attempts to cause damage by virtue of all previously acquired knowledge.
In particular, this phase may not require physical presence if it is supported by a (parallel) cyber-attack having left secret installations of malware and backdoors in the victim's infrastructure. Each of these phases is, in the game-theoretic treatment of [12] , modeled as a designated type of game; specifically:
• Phase one is captured by a matrix game since there are only finitely many strategies (social engineering, compromising third party suppliers, etc.), to get into the infrastructure at first place. Also, no such strategy may be guaranteed to work, so repeating the attempts is usually necessary (phishing is a good example, since the success of it is due to the mass of emails, which corresponds to a repetition of the strategy).
• Phase two is modeled as a sequential game, in which the attacker's goal is to complete a stage-by-stage path from the initial contact point (end of phase 1) up to the target asset (beginning of phase 3). In case of cyber-attacks, a ''stage'' may physically correspond to a certain sub-network or computer and the respective ''next stage'' is any subnet or computer that is ''closer'' to the target. The understanding of closeness herein depends on the domain context, and can be a certain distance in terms of network node hops, a certain level of privileges due to the position in the company's hierarchy, or -in the case of physical security that we consider hereafterthe number of rooms and security checks to pass until the target asset becomes accessible.
• Phase three is again modeled as a matrix game, with the concrete set of possibilities (for the attacker and the defender) being dependent on the type of access that the attacker has gained. For example, if the adversary has full access to a central server, then the configuration or data within the server may be compromised. The respective defense strategy, in that case, is an integrity check of both, the configuration and data. Clearly, both actions have to be repeated, thus justifying the matrix game model here. For high-security applications, a physical separation between the High-Security Domain (HSD) and the outer company intranet (having an internet connection) may be found. In such cases, strategies from social engineering, e.g., bring-your-owndevice, must be added to the phase three game. For example, the physical separation between networks can be overcome, if a legitimate person with access to the target can be tricked into plugging a virulent USB stick inside, so that the malware can jump over the physical boundary. Likewise, compromising the machinery used inside the HSD by compromising a third party supplier is another way of penetrating a physical separation. All of these strategies, however, depend on information learned in phase two, so the games are clearly connected to each other. Figure 1 displays the modeling graphically and illustrates its relation to Defense-in-Depth (DiD). That is, DiD considers a number of protective shells around an asset, assuming that all of them have to be penetrated in sequence to get to the inner treasure. Our phase two game models exactly this view, with the games in phase one and three corresponding to the start and finish of the attack. A concrete game model in this framework is instantiated ''backward'' starting with the phase three game, synonymously thought of as ''stage zero''. It defines its payoffs in terms of the value I 0 of the target asset. This quantity goes into the definition of the payoff matrix A 3 that describes the phase three game. Its saddle-point value val(A 3 ) = I (0) in turn defines the rewards that the phase two game is about. Its structure is recursive, and -in our case for simplicity -will define only two generic actions for both players, where the attacker receives the payoff I (n) at the n-th stage, where n counts from 1 up to the existing number N of stages inside the infrastructure (the phase 1 game is about reaching the outermost, i.e., the N -th, of these stages initially).
• Attacker:
1) Strategy ''penetrate'' corresponds to an active penetration attempt at the n-th stage (here, n counts the number of remaining stages until the final stage n = 0, where the phase three game is played).
The penetration attempt at stage n succeeds with probability p(n), in which case the next stage n − 1 is reached. Otherwise, the attacker remains where it is. 2) Strategy ''stay'' refers to the attacker remaining stealthy and collecting information. In any case, this leaves her/him at the n-th stage, but it takes the risk of being detected with probability 1−q(n).
In the case of a detection, the adversary gets kicked out of the system, and loses everything that has been obtained so far (payoff −I (n)).
• Defender: 1) Strategy ''defend'' means an active defense at the n-th stage, possibly unaware of whether the attacker is also here or not (note that this assumption is an intrinsic asymmetry of information since the attacker has more information about the defenses than the defender has about the attacker). Practically, the defender cannot know where the attacker is, and thus has to mount a best effort in covering a maximal lot of the infrastructure. Therefore, ''defend'' refers basically to the situation, in which the defender uses his full defense power to ensure security. The defender's full power, in its turn, is described as a reference defense strategy, in which the defender, for example, allocate all of his/her available resources to protect the site. For example, in this work ''defend'' implies the complete enforcement of the strategy described in Tables 3 and 4 . 2) Strategy ''not defend'', in contrast, captures the extreme case when the reference defense strategy is not enforced at all; the defender use 0% of his full defense power. Thereby, one goal of the game-theoretic analysis is to tell the optimal level (rate) of enforcing the full power strategy for the defender.
The values p(n) and q(n) may themselves be coming from sub-games played at each stage to account for optimal behavior to accomplish either strategy successfully. We leave these as exogenous parameters to be specified in any way. For this work, we use a simulation described in Sections IV-A and IV-C, to obtain these values (given in Table 5 ). The phase two game description is completed by specifying two costs c and z, where c is the investment made by the attacker for a penetration, and z measures the effort invested in remaining stealthy and learning about the infrastructure (strategy ''stay''). These parameters should be chosen in relation to the inner asset's value and we give an example of such a consideration in Section IV-E.
The payoff structure of the phase two game is then a 2 × 2 recursively defined matrix shown in Table 1 .
The phase one game is about passing stage N , and consequently, has its payoff matrix defined in terms of I (N ) (as coming out of the sequential game in phase two). That is, each combination of attack vs. defense strategy may reward the players with either the full value I (N ) or parts of it (if a strategy has only probabilistic chances to succeed). We leave a concrete example of such a game matrix up to section IV.
IV. SETTING UP THE INTRUSION GAME
For illustrating the application of the game-theoretic attack model to a combination of physical and logical (cyber) security, imagine an enterprise facility in which a valuable asset, say a vital business server (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), etc.), is located in a HSD within some building. For security, the inner domain is physically separated from its environment in the sense that no network connection to the HSD exists, and access to the HSD is up to physical controls. Likewise, the entry to the building is secured by ID checks and surveillance systems are located throughout the entire facility.
To mount an attack, the intruder has to undergo the three phases of our game model, which roughly correspond to the following challenges:
In phase one, it has to establish an initial contact and penetration, which can be done by sending phishing emails (strategy #1), and/or bypassing the doorman. The latter can be done, say in disguise of some legitimate service contractor (say, cleaning staff; strategy #2), or in company of another known employee (exploiting social engineering mechanisms, the doorman could thus be tricked into relying on the other person to be responsible for the visitor, so that no extra ID check is felt necessary; strategy #3). Either way (among possibly many others) constitutes another strategy in the phase one game, which for our small example already makes three strategies on the attacker's side. For the defender, the phase one defense includes (repeated) security training to raise awareness about phishing emails, as well as enforcement of ID checks, say if barriers are installed that open only upon showing an ID or if the doorman consents. These make up two out of perhaps many more options for the defender (but let us keep the example simple for illustration here).
In the phase two game, the attacker's goal is to learn as much as possible about the facility, such as the location and other information about cameras (in order to mount the proper hacks to deactivate some of them later), and to find its way to the HSD. This is phase two, in which the n-th stage corresponds to the attacker's distance counted in ''rooms'' between her/him and the HSD. That is, the n-th stage comprises all locations from where the attacker has to pass another n − 1 rooms (security checks) to reach the HSD. Instantiating the phase two game is a matter of secretly learning about the surveillance (strategy ''stay'' in the game), and later attempting to move to the next room (strategy ''penetrate''), using the previously obtained knowledge to become successful. This strategy may be complemented by having an external helper mounting a cyberattack to deactivate or reconfigure the cameras (towards distraction) so that an insider can install malware or get to the next stage. Our illustrative example will relate to physical security, but the general scheme just described analogously applies to pure cyber-attacks as well.
The defense strategies, respectively, are to do spot checks on the employees (say mobile ID checks), or to temporarily restrict access to rooms (say, if a room cannot be entered many times but only during certain periods, upon a four eyes principle, or similar). This would correspond to the ''defend'' strategy in the game. Likewise, the ''not defend'' strategy would refer to no checks being done on the employees (i.e. definitely missing the attacker), or the doors to next levels are always open and unobserved, and therefore the path to the next room is unblocked.
The phase three game is about overcoming the physical barrier between the surrounding facility and the HSD. This is again a matter of either social engineering to trick someone into bringing a virulent (own) device in, or even compromising a third party vendor to inject malicious softor hardware on the legitimate ways. For either strategy to succeed, however, we assume access or at least information about the inner HSD structure (data items that are commonly enterprise secrets and typically not available to the outside). The game structure is thus roughly similar to that of phase one.
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
Throughout this work, we will use a floor layout of an enterprise building as our running example (see Figure 2) . The organization could be a utility provider (power, gas, or water provider), data centre or an airport, where the safety and security strategies are based on a multi-layer approach. Defining several security layers/levels usually occurs when the risk assessment process reveals that a complete protection is not feasible or not cost-effective and hence available security solutions have to be prioritized in order to guarantee more security for high valuable assets. Therefore, we assume in our scenario that the area layout is known and divided into different levels depending on the distance to the most sensitive zone where high valuable assets are located, such as control rooms, servers, or critical operating machinery. Each level is composed of one or multiple isolated zones. Users, e.g. legitimate employees, visitors, or even intruders can move freely inside each zone. They can leverage alwaysopen intra-level doors to roam about throughout the entire level, or more precisely, throughout the entire zone. Entering a higher sensitive level requires passing through some interlevel doors, which represent access control entry points to each respective level. Unlike intra-level doors, inter-level doors are not always open. They are access controlled doors that will be only unlocked using proper keys or credentials such as valid access badge in case of an automated access control door. In this scenario, we assume that each person entering the facility must have a security badge storing, for example, the owners' ID, name, photo, etc. All data can therefore be retrieved upon scanning the badge with a suitable reader. Additionally, there is a limited number of video surveillance cameras, e.g. PTZ (pan-tilt-zoom) cameras, aiming at augmenting situational awareness in each level. The cameras can be remotely controlled or preconfigured to monitor different areas in a potentially large scene. Finally, there are several security officers patrolling and investigating the different zones on a random basis to identify persons who are not permitted to be at this level. Each security officer is equipped with a mobile badge scanner capable of reading the security badge and checking whether the person holding the badge is the rightful owner. Various technologies can be used to identify the holder of the badge and to ensure high accuracy such as valid card number and a multi-modal biometric system integrating face photo, iris, and fingerprint recognition.
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As a result, intruders will be mainly confronted with two security controls. First, security officers conduct foot patrols and random badge checks in the different zones. Second, inter-level doors are not always accessible due to different reasons such as locked door, a security guard moving close to the door, or a security camera pointing at the target door. In pursuing an APT-like attack pattern, an intruder will have two pure strategies, ''stay'' and ''move''. The ''stay'' strategy refers to the actions taken by the intruders to remain undetected in the reached level. The intruder will try to blend into the zone's environment by the use of matching clothes and behaving normally, i.e. similar to the legitimate users in the respective level. Without attracting attention, an intruder will seek to engage in some zone-related activities and contact some employees, which can provide important opportunities to gather information allowing him to access the next level. The ''move'' strategy, in turn, refers to repeated attempts of the intruder to enter a higher level through an inter-level door. Even if the inter-level doors are secured using some access control mechanisms such as security badge reader or biometrics, an intruder is still able to enter inaccessible levels exploiting different attack vectors such as piggybacking and tailgating. The latter refers to the situation when an intruder follows another authorized employee through passing a door into a higher level, whereas the former refers to a situation when an employee holds a secured door open for an intruder who pretends to be searching for a key or badge. Both attack vectors connote a certain lack of security awareness of employees. Tailgating implies gaining access without consent of the authorized employee, while piggybacking relies on the victim's consent. In addition to this, some employees may occasionally leave a door open longer than planned to finish some inter-level activities providing well-hidden intruders with an excellent opportunity to enter higher sensitive zones in an uncontrolled manner. In some cases, an intruder could also spoof locking systems if he has enough time by using tools such as a strong magnet or a bump key to compromise the lock or a portable reader to capture credentials stored on proximity cards in order to present them to a device securing the door.
B. PHASE ONE
This game will be modeled upon on the following assumptions, referring to the floor layout in Figure 2: • Entering the premises (office, data center, etc.) is only possible through the doors D11 and D12, leading to the Level 1 zone (L11 or L12).
• It is possible to enter a certain area for obtaining a visitor ID card from the security guard (i.e., the doorman) sitting right behind the door.
• To enter the areas that are not public, an automatic check of the ID card is required. Therefore, the ID card only has to be valid, i.e., there is no back-checking whether the person seeking entry is the owner of the ID card.
• The information of the people entering (i.e., Name, photo, etc.) is displayed on a monitor in the doorman's office. This is not checked regularly, especially at times with high fluctuation (people entering/leaving in the morning/evening). Hence, we have the following attack strategies: 1) Forged/Stolen ID Card (F/S ID): an intruder manages to steal or forge an employee's ID card. Since the intruder's face does not match the photo connected to the card ID, this will be recognized during an individual ID check -not at the automated access control at the door. 2) Forged/Stolen Third Party ID Card (F/S TP-ID): an intruder succeeds in stealing or forging the ID card of a third party's employee (e.g., a maintenance or cleaning company, etc.). Since the intruder's face does not match the photo connected to the card ID, this will be recognized during an individual ID check -not at the automated access control at the door.
3) Visitor ID Card for Level 2 (VL2-ID): an intruder
can apply for a Level 2 visitor access card with the security guard at the main entrance (D11 and D12). For a Level 2 clearance, the intruder just needs a contact person working in Level 2, but no appointment. The intruder is then allowed to access rooms at Level 2.
4) Visitor ID Card for Level 3 (VL3-ID): an intruder
can apply for a Level 3 visitor access card with the security guard at the main entrance (D11 and D12). For a Level 3 clearance, the intruder needs a contact person working in Level 3 and an appointment with that person (verified by phone call). The intruder is then allowed to access rooms at Level 2 and Level 3.
5) Visitor ID Card for Level 4 (VL4-ID): an intruder
can apply for a Level 4 visitor access card with the security guard at the main entrance (D11 and D12). For a Level 4 clearance, the intruder needs a contact person working in Level 4, an appointment with that person and has to be registered as a visitor for that day. The intruder is then allowed to access rooms at Level 2, Level 3 and Level 4. Additionally, we have the following defense strategies: 1) None: current situation -no defensive actions are actively done. (this is the case where the current situation is indeed already okay, and nothing needs to be done. The game analysis may be used to verify this hypothesis too). 2) Awareness Training: The security guards at the door are undergoing a security awareness training. As a consequence, they pay more attention to the people entering the building with an ID card (checking the faces displayed at their monitor with the people entering the building). Further, they are more careful when issuing visitor ID cards. 3) Active Face Match Check: One additional security guard is hired to specifically check whether a face of a person matches the photo on the respective ID card. Consequently, the success rate of entering the building with a forged/stolen ID card is lowered. Nevertheless, this is associated with higher costs (due to the additional security guard). 4) ID Check Enforcement: At both entrances (D11 and D12) an ID check is enforced. This means that each person is checked (again) to verify that he/she is having a correct ID card. Consequently, the success rate of entering the building with a forged/stolen ID card is lowered. Nevertheless, this also increases the costs (additional security guards) and the employees' acceptance is very low (due to time consumption). Alternatively, this measure can be suspended during ''rush hours''. 5) Visitor Back Check: for some visitors (random selection) applying for a Level 2 clearance, the security guard checks back with the respective contact person via phone to verify that the contact person is aware of the visitor. This makes it more difficult to enter the premises without a contact person knowing about it. 6) Third Party Back Check: for some people coming from third parties, the security guard verifies with the third party company via phone that the visit is scheduled. This makes it more difficult to use a stolen/forged third party ID card (since the third party company is not aware of some scheduled maintenance, etc.). 7) Reporting Stolen ID Cards: a list of lost/stolen ID cards is present and (frequently?) updated such that the security guard at the entrance can identify stolen ID cards while people are entering. This lowers the success rate of entering with a stolen/forged ID card. 8) Reporting Stolen Third Party ID Cards: a list of lost/stolen ID cards from third parties is present and (less frequently) updated such that the security guard at the entrance can identify stolen ID cards while people are entering. This lowers the success rate of entering with a stolen/forged third party ID card. Towards a specification of payoff matrices, we use a categorical ranking of each defense vs. attack scenario. This avoids issues with goals that cannot be measured numerically, such as reputation, trust, or similar, and is also a recommended practice in many risk management standards like ISO31000 and ISO27005.
In total, we have 9 categories ranging over very low (VL) < low (L) < medium (M) < high (H) < very high (VH), with intermediate categories in between, denoted, e.g., as L-M for a ranking between low and medium. As an important matter of practical modeling and subsequent analysis, let us assume that the categories represent probabilities so that they can be mapped to numeric representatives within the unit interval. This meaning, however, has to be fixed a priori so that the modeling is done bearing this semantic of the categories in mind. The resulting payoff matrix could look like shown in Table 2 . an intruder is staying at the same level, as well as the success rate p of a moving attempt to the next higher level. The simulated physical environment, as illustrated in Figure 2 , consists of an area (32 m × 32 m), divided into four levels ranging from L 1 (less sensitive) with two zones L 11 and L 12 over L 2 and L 3 and ending up with L 4 (most sensitive) with two zones L 41 and L 42 . Therefore, we define Z as a set of the respective zones
Level L 4 , being the most sensitive, is the area in which the direct loss and damage can be inflicted. The intrusion starts when an attacker manages to enter first level L 1 . In our model, we can identify three main actors; viz. employees, security officers, and intruders. Independently of potential attacks that may occur, some security rules must be respected regarding the geographical repartition of human resources (i.e. security guards and employees) in our monitored company depending on the different levels. These rules are as following:
• The higher the level, the higher the security guard density (number of security guards per square meter) is, i.e.
• The higher the level, the lower the employee density is,
The value ρ SG i is the density of security guards in level i, and i E is the density of employees in level i. In our case scenario, we choose the following densities given in Table 3 .
Every employee holds an ID-card proving his identity and his right to be in a given zone. For the sake of simplicity, we are affecting every employee to one single zone and are supposing that he will not move to another zone during the whole simulation (8 working hours). Employees are free to move inside the zone to which they are affected according to the following movement pattern: (i) select a random position inside the area, (ii) move to this position (iii) spend some time (a stay) working in this position. This stay is chosen to be uniformly distributed between 10 and 60 minutes. Similarly, security guards assigned to a given zone remain in this area for the whole simulation. As aforementioned, every security guard follows a schedule of checking missions where he is supposed to move around and check the identity of some randomly selected employees in the zone. A schedule indicates when a mission should start. The number of checking missions is equal to N missions per security guard per day, uniformly distributed over the 8 working hours. In our case scenario, we fixed N missions = 5. Every mission lasts for a duration between 5 and 15 minutes, during which a security guard may check the identity of several employees that he meets (i.e. in his direct vicinity set to a radius of 2.5 meters) in his way. A checking operation may last between 1 and 3 minutes.
In the other hand, intruders are not authorized to be in any of the zones of our company. They are holding fake ID-cards, and are certainly detected upon a check operation. An intruder may choose to remain in the zone where he is, or penetrate to the next level. At the cost of being possibly detected by a security guard, staying in the same zone means adopting a movement pattern similar to a regular employee but with shorter stay time since he has no actual work to do (we set this value to 30s). Penetrating means:
(i) selecting a door at random from the set of doors relating the current level to the next level, (ii) moving towards this door, and then, (iii) when the door is reached, trying to step through it if possible.
If, for some reason (e.g. a locked door), the intruder cannot get through the door, then the penetration attempt counts as a fail, otherwise, it is a success.
The goal of the simulation is to compute: 1) p i : the probability of succeeding in stepping from level L i to level L i−1 , i = 1..3. 2) q i : the probability of remaining undetected if the intruder decides to stay in level L i , i = 1..3. For that purpose, we define two separate scenarios: one for each quantity to be computed.
(I) Compute p i : p i is independent of the number of employees or security guards. Thus, to estimate its value, we will only consider a scenario with intruders. In each zone Z i , we put N intruders (i) = 20 intruders that will be moving inside the zone as described previously. Every intruder will attempt to penetrate once every 5 minutes. For this scenario, an intruder will never actually penetrate. He goes through all the penetration steps but the last one: he selects a door, moves towards it then tries to step through the door without ever doing it. We are rather interested in the result of the attempt than the attempt itself. For an intruder j, and depending on this result, success or fail, an adequate counter is incremented, N sucess (j) or N fail (j) respectively. Recall here that the success or fail of an attempt would be dictated by the fact that when the intruder tries to step through the door, this latter is currently unlocked, or not monitored by a camera or a security guard, etc. (only if the situation is completely safe and that it is physically possible to get through). Of course, security measures are different from level to another depending on the criticality and the value of the assets it contains. In our case, we are more severe as the distance to the target decreases. Therefore, in our simulation, we made doors of higher security levels open less frequently and for shorter time durations compared to lower security levels as shown in Table 4 . Table 4 . The value of p i is then given by equation (1),
(II) Compute q i : For this scenario, we rather want to capture the probability that an intruder located in zone Z i remains undetected. Thus, no penetration attempt will be considered here, as the intruder seeks to learn and prepare for the next penetration attempt. Besides, we located one single intruder to each zone Z i in the area. For a given zone Z i , the probability q i of not being detected is given by the fraction of time spent by the intruder in zone Z i before being detected (which is sojournTime(i)), relative to the maximal time that any employee is permitted to be in the building (which is 8 working hours). The value of q i is then given by equation (2),
Finally, the values of q i and p i are computed as the average over 100 runs. The results are summarized in Table 5 .
D. PHASE THREE
Once inside the high-security area, the intruder may attempt one of the following strategies (out of the non-exhaustive list): 1) Planting Malware/Ransomware at the System: the intruder manages to infiltrate the target server with some kind of ''standard'' malware (e.g., a ransomware to encrypt all the data) by plugging in a USB device. This malware has limited capabilities and just one single purpose. Further, it is relatively easy to detect during an inspection or using malware scanners (if they recognize the malware). 2) Planting a Rootkit at the System: the intruder manages to infiltrate the target server with some kind of special rootkit by plugging in a USB device. This rootkit provides the intruder with extended remote access to the system, even after s/he has left the premises. Hence, much more severe damage can be done to the system. Further, this rootkit is stealthy and can only be detected by an expert inspecting the system thoroughly. 3) Changing Some Config-Files at the System: the intruder manages to access some of the configuration files at the target system and is able to change specific values (e.g., opening ports or changing the black-/whitelist at the firewall). Although this might not have a high immediate effect, this might allow the intruder to access the target system later on from the outside. The changes could be detected by an expert during a detailed inspection or will be reset to standard values upon a new installation of the system. 4) Performing a Malicious Update at the System: the intruder manages to perform an update of the target system from a malicious source of his choice. Hence, the update might look genuine but infiltrate the system with some additional software, which might provide the intruder with extensive access rights to the system. These changes can hardly be recognized during an expert inspection and can only be undone if the system is reset to a standard (initial) state. 5) Physical Tampering with the System: the intruder manages to physically interfere with the target system by integrating a device (e.g., a key logger or an additional network device, etc.). This will allow him to extend the target system's functionalities and to exploit these functionalities to his benefit, e.g., by collecting data or accessing the system from the outside. Further, these functionalities will not show up in a malware/virus scan or during an expert's inspection of the system. They can only be detected by a dedicated check of the system's physical integrity. Correspondingly, the following defense actions are available:
1) None: current situation -no defensive actions are done 2) In-depth Malware Scan: the target system is manually inspected by an IT security expert. This extends the automatic malware scans since the expert takes a detailed look at running processes and checks for irregularities. In this case, new malware or ransomware, which will not be detected by a standard scanning tool will be detected by the expert. Of course, this will be associated with additional costs, since the inspection will take some time. The in-depth malware scan can be performed once a week (''1/week'') or once a month (''1/month''). 3) Clean System Setup: the target system is recurrently set up based on a secure and clean (i.e., malware-free and virus-free) image. In this case, all malware or rootkits, as well as any misconfiguration settings, are deleted and overwritten with genuine data. As a consequence, there is some specific downtime of the system and thus also certain additional costs associated with this re-setup. The clean system setup can be performed once a month (''1/month'') or four times a year, i.e., once every three months (''4/year''). 4) Detailed Physical Check-up: the target system is manually inspected by an IT security expert for any physical tampering with the system. In the course of this inspection, malicious (USB) devices, which have not shown up during software inspections, will be identified and removed. The detailed physical check-up can be performed once a month (''1/month'') or four times a year, i.e., once every three months (''4/year''). With the same categories as in the phase 1 game (see Section IV-B), the payoff matrix in phase three may look as shown in Table 6 .
E. GAME ANALYSIS
The game analysis starts with the phase three game that rewards the adversary with the value of the inner asset VOLUME 5, 2017 I 0 = 100 k$, for example. Mapping each category in Table 6 into an equidistant representative within the unit interval
, we get a numeric (8 × 5)-matrix A 3 , to which standard algorithms to compute Nash equilibria are applicable (e.g., linear optimization or fictitious play). Using fictitious play, we find the equilibrium payoff I (0) = I 0 ·val(A 3 ) ≈ 56, 666.66 $ as a gain for the adversary. The resulting equilibria are listed in Table 9 . Observe that this also tells us that some strategies can be removed from the considerations of both, the attacker and the defender, since there are others that are more promising (for either side). Thus, the initial analysis as described in IV-D is ''thinned out'' by the game-theoretic analysis.
Within phase two, there are basically two points to start from within the building, which are rooms L 11 and L 12 . Both have slightly different chances to be passed, and in the worst case, the attacker takes the one that is easier to get through, which is room L 12 , based on the simulation in Table 5 .
The costs c and z for the strategies ''penetrate'' and ''stay'' require careful choices, and can be based on recent reports on the costs for cybercriminal activities. In a purely cyberphysical attack (deviating from our example for the moment), penetration would mean to activate, in fact, buy, some malware to get to the next level. Likewise, staying means running exploit kits to figure out possibilities where and how malware can be put to work. The report of E.Maor [30] indicates the cost for (hand-crafted) malware to be up to 20 k$ (on a license basis), while exploit kits are much cheaper and offered for monthly rental at (only) 2 k$, for instance.
Returning to our example of physical intrusion, the values of c and z in phase 2 should be set in a reasonable relation to the inner asset's value (serving the assumption that the attack should be economic, otherwise, the adversary would be better off by refraining from attacking at all). Taking I (0) ≈ 57 k$, we thus set c ≈ 15 k$ and z ≈ 200 $ (say, if the exploit kit is bought ''off-the-shelf''. Other choices are of course possible, and our setting is only for illustration here).
Having the phase two game fully instantiated, we can solve for mixed strategies in the payoff structure (Table 1) , to get the sequence of equilibrium payoffs and equilibrium strategies.
The easiest way to do so is by an inductive computation of I (n) from I (n − 1), starting with I (1) being computed from I (0) as the value of the inner asset in light of its defense in the phase three game. With I (n − 1) given numerically, we can instantiate the phase two game as an equation I (n) = val(A 2,n (I (n), I (n − 1))), where val is the saddle-point value function of the payoff matrix A 2,n that here depends on I (n) (unknown variable) and I (n − 1) (known from the past iteration). Although the game is again finite (in fact a 2 × 2 matrix game), we cannot use linear optimization or fictitious play any more to compute its equilibrium, since the saddle point value I (n) appears within the payoff structure. So, we substitute I (n) =: x and resort to numeric minimization of f (x) := |x − val(A 2,n (x, I (n − 1)))| in terms of x. The existence of an equilibrium then translates into saying that f (x) = 0 is attained for some x, which is exactly the equilibrium that we are looking for in the minimization. Here, f is usually not differentiable, but has an analytic representation, so that it can be fed into the NMinimize function in Mathematica [31] . The values of I (n) approximated in this way are displayed in Table 8 . This numeric approximation comes at the cost of not delivering any equilibrium strategies along with x = I (n), so that these have to be computed from the game matrix after substituting the value found for I (n). With I (n) obtained from the minimization, and I (n−1) known from the previous calculation, the payoff structure becomes a fully numeric (2 × 2)-matrix, for which equilibrium strategies can be computed by well known formulae.
The results of this process digs up optimal strategies for both, the attacker and the defender to attain the equilibrium outcome at each stage, as listed in Table 8 , where only the likelihood for one of the two actions is given (the probability for the other action is obvious). The minus sign for the values I (n) indicates that those are investments for the attacker to be made for passing towards the inner stage. Hence, the overall physical security in phase two would be an obstacle of roughly I (1) + I (2) + I (3) ≈ −5, 499 $ payoff (i.e., investment) to overcome it for the adversary (expecting a reward of about 100 k$ if it gets to the high-security area, so the attack appears indeed quite economic up to this point).
However, our example displays an interesting catch with how the results are to be interpreted: observe that the ''best behavior'' for the attacker is to ''stay'' in phases 2 and 3, which would correspond to stopping the attack immediately after having entered the infrastructure. This is clearly implausible and an unrealistic behavior if the first defense barrier (the phase one game) has been overcome already.
The seeming paradox is resolved by recalling that our model assumes a zero-sum game, which is only valid in giving a guaranteed saddle-point value for the defender (conditional on that player following its equilibrium strategy), but it cannot make reliable predictions about the attacker's real behavior (since the true incentive may not be reflected accurately). Still, the saddle-point value of the game is a sharp bound to how much harm the attacker can cause, and there are other strategies that can achieve the same performance under much more plausible behavior. These strategies need not even be equilibria, since the equilibrium strategies x * 2,n , y * 2,n for a payoff matrix A 2,n clearly satisfy val(A 2,n ) = I (n) = (x * 2,n ) T A 2,n y * 2,n , but other solutions may co-exist. In fact, it is easy to numerically find alternative and fully mixed behavior rules x = (x, 1 − x), y = (y, 1 − y) delivering the same ''value'' I (n). All we need to do is numerically solving the equation (x, 1 − x) · A 2,n · y 1−y = I (n) = val(A 2,n ), within the (constrained) domain 0 < x, y < 1 that contains only fully mixed strategies (which can be more plausible in our setting). This can again be done by numeric minimization, or other standard techniques.
The resulting solution is not necessarily an equilibrium but still can achieve the equilibrium performance. And indeed, for our example, we find x ≈ 0.0217, y ≈ 0.004 in stage 1, x ≈ 0.447, y ≈ 0.073 in stage 2, and x ≈ 0.959, y ≈ 0.941 in stage three of the phase two game. An attacker following these (non-equilibrium) strategies acts much more plausible, since: once the attacker has gained access to the building, there is expectedly little security found immediately after, since people may rely on the outer checks to keep intruders out. Therefore, the attacker may be more ''aggressive'' at outer stages, reflected by higher chances to penetrate (note that we read Table 8 upwards here, but refer to the nonequilibrium values as given above, not the table). However, the closer it gets to the HSD, the more security is to be expected, and the more time is spent passively to learn how to get to the next stage. This is reflected by the decreasing likelihoods to penetrate when we get closer to the center. Thus, a more plausible behavior may indeed be a non-equilibrium strategy as described in the text above, although the best defense is validly obtained from the game analysis, and can be read off Table 8 . The properties of equilibria herein assure that if the defender adheres to its equilibrium strategy, then every different action mounted by the attacker can only produce less or equal damage than predicted by the game and told in Table 8 .
Summarizing the lesson learned from this example in the phase two game, the equilibrium computation is good to find optimal defenses and risk assurances, but should not be taken as a plausible indication of attack behavior.
Finally, there is the phase one game to be won in order to enter the facilities initially. Like with the phase three game, we can map the categories to numerical representatives within the unit interval [0, 1]. To get the overall investment for the attacker, remember that the phase 1 game is about keeping the attacker out. Its equilibrium strategies x * for the defender and y * for the attacker are given in Table 9 (only for those that are relevant, i.e., have a positive likelihood to be played at all), with the game's value being val(A 1 ) ≈ 0.6375.
The subtotal payoff for the attacker after winning phase two of the game is the amount I 3 that accumulates across all stages including I (0) as the attacker's reward of winning in phase three and the investments {I (1), I (2), I (3)} used for bypassing the physical security mechanisms (three stages) in phase two, if the equilibrium policy is obeyed; We thus get
Since we instantiated the game matrix in phase one with values in [0, 1], and assuming that the categories reflect likelihoods (in the modeling, this semantic was fixed a priori, so that the assessment is correctly done in these terms), we may interpret val(A 1 ) as a probability; in fact, the probability to win I 3 in this phase. Thus, the overall expected reward for the attacker upon winning the phase one game is I (4) = I 3 · val(A 1 ) ≈ 32, 619.53 $. Consequently, the net investment (efforts) to overcome the overall security, including the entire lot of security measures starting with protection against phishing, inside surveillance and ID checks, up to technical precautions like frequent checkups of the server, is approximately I 0 − I (4) ≈ 67, 380.47 $, which is the value obtained by the adversary upon conquering the inner asset, minus the expected reward after winning the three game phases. Since the overall attack efforts to penetrate the protective shells is less than the inner asset value, the attack would indeed be economically paying, and should therefore be expected.
V. CONCLUSION
Contemporary attacks to cyber-physical systems are often characterized by being very much targeted, accurately tailored to the infrastructure at hand, and spending lots of efforts to remain stealthy until damage can be caused. These are typical properties of advanced persistent threats, but these features are shared by any kind of successful intrusion. We have presented a game-theoretic approach to capturing different phases of an intrusion attempt. Simulation has been pointed out as a valuable tool to define proper model parameters. The model sensitivity to its parameters is partly continuous (whenever the parameter is a real number), but also a matter of proper definition of categories and their respective representatives. The latter is tied to issues of fuzziness in the VOLUME 5, 2017 available information regarding the model (specification of payoffs) and imperfect (i.e., not always rational) behavior of the players. Therefore, looking deeper into models of bounded rationality, such as prospect hierarchy, the cognitive hierarchy or related theories, appears as an important direction to continue this line of research in the future.
Towards the goal of using the game model for an optimized defense at known (optimized) costs, the meaning of saddlepoint values and equilibrium strategies must be considered carefully, as has been pointed out by the example, which by enforcing mixed strategies would already correspond to somewhat bounded rationality, if the optimum (equilibrium) is in pure strategies. The example, however, shows that even imperfect rationality can achieve the optimum, which makes bounded rationality models even more interesting to consider here. Overall, game theory and simulation can be a powerful combination in the protection against physical intrusion, if they are being used properly. This work shall be a guideline and starting point to this end.
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